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Suarez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body
James B. South
The starting point for this essay is the year 1500 . As a date, it certainly sounds auspicious-a mere seventeen years before Luther and his ninety-five theses, thirty years before Copernicus put down in writing some of his thoughts, forty years before the issuance by Pope Paul III of R egimini militantis ecclesi and the fo unding of the Society of Jesus, and forty-eight years before the birth of Francisco Suarez. In 1500, in a classroom in Padua , Pietro Pomponazzi stated that two conditions needed to be met in order to show that the soul is immortal: the soul (or the intellect at any rate) must be (1) free from bodily lo cation and (2) free from the mediating role of bodily powers. In his technical la nguage, if the soul is to be considered immortal, the body cannot be a subj ect for an immortal intellective soul, that is, the so ul 's operations cannot exclusively take place in bodily organ. At the same time the soul should not need the body as an object, that is, the body cannot be a necessary condition for all operations of the intellect.
1 It was another sixteen years before Pomponazzi would publish his £'unous treatise On the Immortality if the Sou l in which he argued that neither condition could be defended philosophically. That was three years after the Fifth Lateran Council in its eighth session declared that there were three most pernicious errors corrupting the minds ofthe faithful : that the ra tional soul is mortal, that there is one rational soul for all humans, and that either of these claims can be true according to philosophy. In short Pompanazzi's later work set off a firestorrn of controversy over the issue of immortality. It is too big a question to ask here what it was about these twen ty-five years or so that made the issue of immortality so crucial and the rhetorical pitch so high. It was certainly not unprecedented to doubt the demonstrability of inm10rtality . Scotus had done so , and Cajetan during the 1520s-after becoming a Cardinal-classed the immortality of the soul, along with the Trinity, as topics about which philosophers had no certain kno wledge. Nonetheless between the Council and the Pomponazzi affair, as M artin Pine has correctly noted, th e contro versy concern ing immortality 'prod uced the most important debate within sixteenth century C hristendom prior to the R eformation . ,2 In what follows I connect Suarez to this immortality debate. Suarez certainly knew Pomopnazzi's work, although most scholars writing on Suarez are more likely to situate him in the context of the tradition of Scholastic thought rather than the more secular Aristotelianism prevalent at Padua and elsewhere in Italy thro ughout the fift eenth and sixteenth centuries. Typically, in fact, Suarez situated himself within the Scholastic tradition and that self-positioning is apparent in the texts on which I focus . Nonetheless, I think that a careful reading of Suarez's discussion ofinunortality shows that his thought here was decisively shaped by Pomponazzi's challenge.
Suarez's most extensive discussion ofimmoltality occurs in Disputation 2, qu estion 3 of his Commentary on the D e anima. 3 After having treated of the nutritive and sensitive souls in the first two questions of the disputation, in Question 3 he asked: 'Whether the principle of human understanding is something incorporeal, subsistent, and inunortal?' In answering this he drew six conclusions. The fmt was that the human soul is inmuterial and subsistent. W e will return to the argument he provided for that view. H e then provided a second conclusion: the human intellective principle is immortal. And then a third conclusion: the oldest and most important philosophers think the soul is immortal, as do the vast majority of humans throughout history. And these ancient philosophers and this multitude of common humanity came to this conclusion through the light of natural reason apart from the illumination of faith . At this point, though, Suarez admitted that there is one striking omission in his list of eminent philosophers who accept immortality, namely Aristotle. Accordingly he promised to return to a discussion of Aristotle's own acco unt. H aving treated the philosophical arguments for inunortality, he proceeded to discuss the place of the claim of llru110rtality within the realm offaith. So Suarez's fourth conclusion is that it is 'most certain ' according to the Catholic faith that the soul never perishes. The fifth conclusion is that faith teaches not only the inunortality of the soul but that the soul is iJruno rtal by its nature and not through some special gift of God. Finally, he maintained that it is most pious and consistent with faith to hold that the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated through natural reason. In this chapter I will avoid talking about the last three points since such a discussion would take us too far afield by propelling us into a study of the context of Suarez's teaching and the need to deal with the skeptical tendencies within both the Catholic and Protestant discussions of immortality. Instead, in what follows we are only going to treat his conclusions concerning the philosophical arguments for immortality and the interpretation of Aristotle.
One additional preliminary note is in order. As I proceed the reader might be surprised that no mention is made of Averroes . In fact Suarez devoted a separate question to Averroes's teaching concerning the intellective soul. Still the dispute between Suarez and Averroes was not the same as the one that he treats in the question on inm10rtality. Certainly Averroes th ought that the intellecti ve soul is immortal. H ence, it makes sense that the question of the number of intellects would arise subsequ ent to Question 3, which gives us reason to believe that the intellective soul can exist apart from the body. However, in case yo u are curious about Suarez's attitude towards Averroesism, he considered it not only opposed to faith but philosophically 'sheer delirium and unintelligible error.'4 I: The probable arguments While the bulk of this chapter will deal with Suarez's one demonstrative argument for immortality and his reading of Aristotle, I would be remiss if I did not mention the arguments that he thought indicated, but don' t prove, that the soul is immortal . These arguments are unoriginal and I think it is pretty clear that Suarez included them because they were current. There is a noticeable lac k of enthusiasm and, more striking still, an uncharac teristic brevity in his treatment of them .
The first has to do with God's providential governance of the world . The point here is that the wicked are to be punished and the virtuous rewarded. Yet looking aro und it is pretty obvious that the world does not work that way-the wicked live lives full of delight, while the virtuous live lives filled with toil. This is incompatible with God's ruling providence. Accordingly there must be an afterlife in which the good receive what is due to them and the wicked receive their just deserts.
A second argumen t concerns the end of the soul. Everything has an end in which it rests once it has achieved it. Yet we rarely find rest in this life because of all the troubles we meet with along the way. So the soul's immortality is needed to provide an opportunity to rest in our beatitude.
A third argument concerns a natural desire in humans, namely, that we all desire to live forever. It would be strange if such a natural desire were frustrated. Oddly Suarez does not dwell on this argument, even though he surely knew it was the centerpiece of Marsilio Ficino's argument for human immortality in his Platonic Theology.s Instead he quickly moved on to a fourth argument, one taken from human dignity. It is clear, he stated, that humans are both the head (caput) and end of the entire universe. As such , it would be absurd should humans live no longer than the beasts who serve them or more briefly than the sun that provides us with wam1th.
Finally the fifth argument was concemed with virtue. The idea is that our awareness of immortality is the foundation of virtue . Without such an awareness of immortality, humans would live as animals and would fall into baseless thoughts such as 'Let us eat and drink , for tomorrow we may die,' or (quoting Augustine) 'If the soul is mortal, I think that the palm goes to Epicurus.'6 Now all of these arguments are contestable. More importantly, all had in fact been contested. Pomopnazzi had argued, for example, that virtue was its own reward and that the rationality of pursuing virtue was relatively evident. I do not want to dwell on the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments in any detail. It is sufficient to note that Suarez was convinced that these arguments were not demonstrative. He stated that the most powerful is the first: the wicked must be punished and the virtuous rewarded ifindeed God is the providential ruler of the world . Their most striking commonality is that all concemed what we might call the practical side of human life: our desires, virtue, happiness, and the like. By contrast, the demonstrative argument to follow is fLITnly situated on the theoretical side.
II: The demonstrative argument
The second conclusion in the Third Disputation is that the immortality of the soul can be demonstrated evidently by natural reason. That is a very strong claim and one hopes for a strong argument. Here's the argument:
st. Thomas demonstrates this conclusion at I, q. 75, a. 6 from what has preceded, for the rational so ul is per se subsistent; th erefo re, it is incorruptible. The consequence is clear, for it is corrupted either per se or per accidens. Now, it is not corrupted per accidens since it belongs to something to be generated and corrupted in the way in which it exists. Therefore, in the case of that to which existence belon gs per se, it belongs to it to be generated or co rrupted per se, or it belongs to it in no way. Now, he proves that it does not belong to it per se, for what is form alone and subsistent cannot possibly be corrupted per se. It is proved: for, what belongs per se to so mething ca nnot possibly be separa ted from it. Now, existence belongs per se to fonn. Therefore, it is impossible for existence to be separated from form; therefore, it is impossible for fonn to be corrupted. ' (CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 32, 1: 202) . Suarez asserted that this argument is sufficiently metaphysical, ac ute, and dem onstrati ve, but he also admjtted that it is obscure and proceeds to provide some clarifica tion.
First Suarez did a little definitional work. After all one might trunk it a bit odd to say that nature could intend corruption per se since it is m ore accurate to say that nature intends generation per se. So he clarified the sense of corruption by restricting corruption per se to that which first temunates a corruption, that is, to what primarily ceased to exist in a corruption. By contrast corruption per accidens occurs when something ceases to be as the result of the cessation of something else. This ra ther concise acco unt is illuminated by an example: w hen fi re is generated fro m air, air is said to be corrupted per se. But th e fo rm of air and some of its accidents are said to cease to be as a result of such a per se corruption, that is, they are corrupted per accidens. So, restricting himself to forms, Suarez accepted that a fonn could be corrupted in two ways : it could be corrupted per accidens, that is, when the whole is corrupted. T hat is, when air becomes fi re the fonn of air is corrupted since the form of air cannot exist on its own. It is in this way that all material fom1s cease to be. But as a subsistent fo rm the h uman soul is different fro m a material fo rm since it does not cease to be when it is separated fro m its body because it has its being per se and independently of the body. Thus the corruption of a subsistent form , say the form of a huma n being, must be corrupted per se if it is corrupted at all . O f course the assumption here is that existence belongs to subsistent fo nns per se.
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That assumption warrants additional explication and Suarez provided it. Existence belongs to f01111 in such a way that thro ugh form it belongs to the fom1 to have existence . So if a form is subsistent, existence belongs to it as such as it is the proper receptive capacity of existence . But if a fonn is not subsistent, existence belongs to it as a principle by which the composite exists. In short a form is that which ful fills the proper receptive capacity of existence, and hence we cannot attribute existence to anything except by attributing form to it. And, obviously enough, it follows that we cannot separate existence from something unless we separa te it from its form. But since a fo rm cannot be separated from itself, if existence belongs to a form as such, then the form cannot be separated fro m existence, and that means the form is incorruptible. Now, I want to say two things about this argument. First the argument is not very strong, and second Suarez recognized, despite his claim to the contrary, that it was not a very strong argument. N ow the relative weakness of the argument is easy to characterize, and R obert Pasnau has done a nice j ob summari zing the worry (alth ough as we shall see, the argument against it goes back at least to the sixteenth century). Aquinas's non per accidens, qllia sic competit alicui fieri et comlInpi sicllt et esse; ergo clli convenit per se esse, convenit per se fieri et corru mpi, vel nllllo modo convenient. Q lIod alltem non per se conveniat probat, nam qllod est [onna cantllm et SlIbsistens, impossibile est per se cO ITlImpi. Probatllr, nam qllod per se alicui con venit, impossibile est separari ab ilIo; esse alltem per se convenit fonnae ; ergo impossibile est separari ab ilIa; ergo impossibile est corrum pi ' (CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 21, 1: 188). argument (and Suarez's) is either badly mistaken or contains a serious omission. In Pasnau's words, 'by establishing that the human soul is subsistent, he has shown that it is not destroyed simply in virtue of the body's being destroyed ... . Yet the human soul might be dependent on the body in some other way.'l0 And, as Pasnau further notes, this objection apparently occurred to Aquinas himself, since in Summa theologiae la.75.6 he raised this very claim as an objection and recognized the tight link between intellectual cognition and bodily existence:
Moreover, nothing exists without its own proper operation. But the proper operation of th e so ul, which is to und erstand with a phantasm, cannot exist without the body. For, as is said in the De anima, the soul understands nothing without a phantasm (De anima III , 7 431a 16-17); and the phantasm does not exist without the body (De Anima I, 1 403a8-10). Therefore, when the body is destroyed, the soul cannot remain. 1 ! Aquinas's response to this objection is striking: 'To the third, it must be said that to understand with a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul insofar as it is united to a body. But, separated from the body, it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from the body, as will be clear below. '12 Pasnau's assessment of this response is that it is 'lamely ad hoc.'13 In short Aquinas just admitted that his argument for immortality is either a complete sleight of hand or woefully incomplete. Unless he could properly show that the intellect can operate without the body, he did not really have a proof for the immortality of the soul. Or, with a slightly diffetent emphasis, unless it can be shown that the intellective soul does not need the body 'at all, it has not been shown that the intellect can survive when the body is destroyed. So even granted the claim that the soul is subsistent, Aquinas does not have a convincing argument for its inunortality. 14 I now move on to my second claim, namely, that Suarez was aware of this gap in Aquinas ' argument. For support we need only look at the structure of his question on inunortality. Suarez devoted two and a half pages to a discussion of the demonstrative argument. Yet he devoted eleven pages to discussing exactly those passages in Aristotle that Thomas mentioned in his third objection. And, it should be added, he devoted 10 Robert Pasnau, 77wmas Aquinas 01'1 Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 366. 11 'Praeterea, nulla re~ est sine propria operatione. Sed propria operatio animae, quae est intelligere cum phantasmate, non potest esse sine corpore, nihil enim sine phantasmate intelligit anima; phantasma alltem non est sine corpore, lit dicitur in libro De anima. Ergo anima non potest remanere, destructo co rpore ' (ST, 1 a. q. 75 , art. 6, obj. 3, 11: 26-8) .
!2 'Ad tertium dicendum guod intelligere cum phantasmate est propria operatio an.imae secundum guod corpori est unita. Separata alltem a corpore habebit alium modum intelligendi, similem aliis substantiis a corpore separatis, lit infra melius patebit' (ST, 1 a.g . 75, art. 6, resp . 3, 11: 32 much more time to these passages than any other discussion in this question. In short he recognized that everything hinged on these texts and how they should be interp reted.
As previously mentioned, in 1500 Pomponazzi set the parameters for the way this question was going to be discussed in the sixteenth century and placed the emphasis on the intellect's dependence on phantasms rather than its per se subsistence . Indeed in his discussion of Aquinas in the De immortalitate of15 16 Pomponazzi did not even mention the argument for inUTIortality based on subsistence. Instead he argued that Aquinas misunderstood the way the intellect depended on the body in cognition . When Gasparo Contarini, a former student of Pomponazzi, wrote his trea tise against the De immortalitate, it was precisely this fac t that he seized on. Pomponazzi, he claimed, had overlooked the key role that subsistence played in the Angelic Doctor's argument. But once this aspect of Thomas' argument was bro ught to his attention Pomponazzi became dismissive, stating that an Aristotelian account offonn and matter requi res that the form cannot be separa ted from the body in any natural way. The emphasis there is on the 'natu ral' since Pomponazzi did recognize at least one instance in w hich fom1 and matter are separa ted: the case of the sacram ent of the Mass. But that was clearly a miraculo us separa tion, not a natural one, and Pomponazzi maintain ed that the philosoph er should not explain the relation of soul and body in tenns of a divine miracle.
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So despite Contarini 's attempt to reorient the discussion, Pomponazzi return ed to the crucial issue of the relation between th e intellect and corporeal organs in cognition:
By the interio r senses we know the universal in a certain way. For although we cannot attain th e pu re universal thro ugh the interior senses, we still arrive at a certain indetenninate knowledge that is, as it were, th e mea n between the singular and the universal, and w hich is called the knowledge of th e indifferent singu lar. For we thin k of the elephant, alth ough not of this one or that one, bu t it still is not a uni versal cognition . After these cognitions, we ascend through th e in tellect to the nature of th e elephant in a universal sense, w hich is neither a defmite individual no r a particular cognition, since the first is the fun ction of the external se nses while the second is the fun ctio n of the intern al senses. But although this occurs in this way, neverth eless it is not free from some support (adminiw lo) of sense because it cannot be accomplished without a phantasm, as we experience in ourselves. 16 So in stressing that Pomponazzi connected sense cognition and intellectual cognition in such a way that the intellect cannot exist without sense, I wa nt to show that the terms of the debate as Suarez had to address them were to be fo und in an account of cognition rather than in the metaphysics of form . And it is an acco unt of cognition in which the demarcation between sense (both external an d internal) and intellect becomes clear. In addition to the apparent philosophical incompleteness of Aquinas' argument, then, the debate over in1mortality as fram ed by Pompo nazzi contributed to Suarez's strategy in discussing texts fro m Aristotle even after having given what he claims is a demonstrative argument for immortality based on subsistent fom1.
III: Suarez and some texts from Aristotle 'The mind of Aristotle is exceedingly obscure on this point.' Suarez was talking about Aristotle's view concerning immortality. Despite the obscurity of Aristotle's texts, he had a definite view of how to read th em. Aristotle, Suarez believed, accepted the immortality of the soul but for some reason never said so explicitly (perhaps because he did not have a demonstrative argument or perhaps because he had nothing to say about th e status of the separated soul).17 Suarez tried to convince us that there are passages that reveal the real mind of Aristotle. But rather than run through Suarez's reading of a number of Aristotelian texts, I simply want to show how he approached the problem of interpreting Aristotle. For from that starting point we shall soon be in a position to see his absolutely critical and rather startling move.
There are three passages from the first book of the De anima around which Suarez framed his discussion. 18 The fmt of these is set fo rth as a conditional: if understanding is phantasy, that is, a kind of imagination or it is not without imagination, then understanding can not exist without the body. The other two texts he considered were propositions that Aristotle set forth as 'fo undations and fmt principles ' for investigating the question of immortality. These are (1) if the human soul has some proper way of being affected or some proper operation, it can be separated from the body and (2) if there is no proper way of its being affected, or there is no proper operation, it is not separable. These two go together since the y follow from another claim in Book I: operation is proportioned to potency and potency is proportioned to form-so that operation follows form as a second act to the first act. Setting aside discussion of the conditional, Suarez drew the following conclusion from the two first principles found in Book I: if an operation has no dependen ce on the body as from a subject, then the form from which it flows will have no dependence on the body as from a subject. This rather opaque conclusion simply means that the intellect's operation (and hence the foml to which it is proportioned) must not exist in a corporeal organ. But if every operation has a dependence on the body, the form will have a dependence as well .
Thus it takes only one operation with no dependence on the body to show the independence of the foml no matter how many other of its operations might be so dependent.
19
Let us slow down, though, and see how he derived that conclusion from the two ftrst principles. In his discussion of these two first principles Suarez began from the following basic premise: all vital operations, that is, all the operations that living beings perfom1, for example, breathing, eating, sensing, and, in humans, understanding, have their origin exclusively in the soul. This follows from the very definition of the soul as the first principle of life . Now some operations of the soul, for example, growth, nutrition, and sensing originate in the soul but are perfected in the body. The technical tem1 that Suarez invoked here is that they are all 'subjected ' (subiectantur) , that is, they exist in the body as in a subject. These operations are the so-called 'common' operations of the soul. By contrast a proper operation of the soul is one that originates in the soul, as all vital operations must, but also is received in the soul (and so exists in the soul) without any corporeal in strument. The contrast is straightforward. Consider vision-the power of vision originates in the soul but can occur only by means of a corporeal instrument, the organ of sight. T ake away the organ of sight, say through injury, and vision cannot perform its operation. So what Suarez must find to prove the soul's immortality is a proper operation-one that needs no corporeal instrument for its functioning since only such an operation would not exist in the body as in a subj ect. 2o
Prior to Pomponazzi it was assumed that if one could show that there existed such a proper operation of the soul-understanding was the primary candidate-that would suffice to show that the soul did not depend on the body in such a way as to jeopardize its immortal status. As Suarez put it: 'thus, if an operation has no dependence on the body as on a subject, the form [the soul] will not have one.'21 But as we have seen, Pomponazzi changed the tenm of the debate with his claim that the problem of dependence was not just a matter of where the operation is terminated. Instead he pressed the objection that the 'obj ective' dependence of the soul on the body was sufficient to block the conclusion of immortality. That meant that Suarez could not rest with the mere assertion that there is an operation of the intellect that does not exist in a bodily organ subjectively. After all, Pomponazzi himself was as convinced of that position in regard to intellectual operations just as much as anyone who holds to immortality. As we saw in Pomponazzi's response to Contarini the issu e comes down 20 Much of the way that Suarez set up the problem came from Aquinas's Sellterlcia libri De allima, Book [, lectio 2: 'Quanwis autem hoc Aristoteles scilicet apen e manifestet in tenio huius, nihilominus tamen quantum ad hoc aliquid exponemus. Nam intelligere quodanunodo est proprium animae, quodammodo est coniuncti. Sciendum est igitur, q uod aliqua o peratio anim ae aut passio est, quae indiget corpore sicut instmmemo et sicut obiecto. Sicut videre indiget corpore , sicut obiecto, quia color, qui est obiectum visus, est in corpo re . Item sicut instrumento; quia visio, etsi sit ab anima, no n est calnen nisi per o rganulll visus, scilicet pupilJam, quae est ut instmmemum; et sic videre non est animae tamum, sed est organi . AEqua autem operatio est, quae indiget corpore, non tamen sicut instmmemo, sed sicut obiecto tantum. lntelligere enim non est per organum corporaJe, sed indiget obiecto corporaJi. Sicut enim philosoph us dicit in tenio huius, hoc modo phamasmata se habent ad intellectum, sicut colo res ad visum . Colores autem se habent ad visum , sicut obiecta: phantasmata ergo se habent ad intellectllm sicut obiecta. C um autem phantasmata non sine sine corpore, videtu r quod intelligere non est sine corpore: it.1 tamen quod sit sicut obiectum et non sicut instmmentum. ' to the' obj ective' relation between imagination and intellect. If the intellect is dependent on the imagination as an obj ect, then it cannot be immortal.
What Suarez thus needed in order to overcome Pomponazzi's argument was a passage where Aristotle stated that the human soul does have som e operation obj ectively independent of the body as well as subj ectively independent. N ow there is one very famo us passage that suggests Suarez is out oflu ck and that is the third passage fro m De anima I, the conditional previously m entioned: if understanding is phantasy, that is, a kind of imagination, or it is not without imagination, then understanding cannot exist without th e body22 In addition there is a very fa mous claim in book III of De anima,23 which Suarez summarized bluntly as, 'we neither understand nor can understand without imagination.'24 N ow fro m the conditional and the claim in Book III , Suarez set out the argument he must refute:
1. If to understand is imagination , or not without imagination, the soul is not separable.
T o understand is not without imagination.
Therefore,
T he soul is not separable.
On e way to deal with this argument is to do exactly what Aquinas did . Without naming T hom as, Suarez pointed out that distinguishing between understanding in this life and understanding simply speaking is a possible stra tegy . That is, while in this life we cannot understand without inlagination , it can be claimed that in the next life ~e can. Suarez, however, rej ected this move, stating that 'this solution is displeasing.' He gave two reasons, both of which seem consistent with Pasnau's obj ection that such a move is 'lamely ad hoc.' Indeed Suarez seems even harsher: 'what is advanced,' he said, 'is rendered useless in every way.'25 In other words it assumes what needs to be proven by assuming two different 'states' of the soul, one when it is in a body and another in which it is apart from the body. As a solution it begs the question because it asserts that the soul can understand without a phantasm when it is separate from the body, but what needs to be proven is that the sou] can exist apart fro m the body in the flrst place.
Suarez then proceeded to make a three-fo ld distinction about the way that an operation of a power can depend on another material power. An operation can be elicited from a power the way that an act ofimagining, for exampl e, is elicited from the imagination. In another way, though, an operation might depend on a power insofar as the latter provides an obj ect for the operation . T he examples he mentioned involve the way that a sensitive appetite depends on imagination and the way that the imagination 22 ARl, 403a8-9, 1: 642. 23 ARI, 1: 680. 24 'intellegere nostrum neque est nee esse potest sine phantasia' (CDA, disp . 2, a. 3, no . 42, 1: 220). 25 ' Q uia reddit proeesslllll omnjno inmilem ' (ib id. no. 45, 1: 226). depends on external sensation. And in a third way the operation can depend on the power as something concomitant. This last sense of dependence, Suarez tells us, is the most improper kind of dependence, so it is unlikely that this is what Aristotle meant in the conditional under consideration. So only the two proper senses of dependence can be involved in Aristotle's claim, and Aristotle was asserting that if understanding is imagination, that is, if it is an operation elicited from imagination, or an operation not without imagination-if it is of the same order with the operation of imagination, in other words-then intellect is not without a body. These are, of course, just Pomopnazzi's 'subjective' and 'objective' dependencies in slightly different language. [n short assuming the flrst two senses of dependence, the operation of the intellect will always need a body and thus there will be no proper operation of the intellect since any operation it performs is conunon to both the soul and th e body. TIllS, and only this, is the proper way to interpret w hat Aristotle meant in the fmt premise of the argument,z6
Regarding the second prenllse, there is no way to get around it since it is a given in Aristotelian discussions of cognition. There is no understanding without imagination. Yet everything is going to tum on a constmal of the way in which the proper operation of the intellect depends on imagination. Suarez has now set up the problematic in such a way that dependence will jeopardize immortality only if the soul has no proper operation at all , that is, if all its operations require the body in the way that an act of imagination req uires imagination or as imagination requires sensory experience.
The recurring theme in Pomponazzi's De immortaiitate, reiterated forcefully in his response to Contarini, is precisely the dependence of the intellect on imagination, which is the same sort of dependence that imagination has in relation to sensory experience, that is, objective dependence:
But although the human intellect, as has been considered, does not use quantity in knowing, nevertheless, sin ce it is joined (coniunctus est) to sense, it cannot be released entirely from matter and quantity, since it never knows without a phantasm, as Aristotle says in De anima III: 'The soul does not know at all without a phantasm.' H ence, it thus needs the body as object. Nor can it know a universal unqualifiedly but always sees the universal in th e singular, as everyone can observe within himself For in all cognition, however far abstracted, it fonns some bodily image (idohnn) 27
Accordingly what Suarez had to do was develop an acco unt of at least one operation of the soul that does not require the body as either a subject (sense one above) or an obj ect (sense two above). And the way he attempted that was by emphasizing that the only 26 CD A, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 45 ,1: 228. 27 'At quamvis intellectus humanus, ut habitu m est, intelligendo non fungatu r quantitate, attamen, quoniam sensui coniunctus est, ex tOto a nlareria et quantitate absolvi non potesc, cum nunlquanl cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aristotele tenio De anill1a: Neql/aql/all1 sine phantasmate illtelligit allima. Unde sic indigens corpore ut obiecto neque simpliciter universale cognoscere potest, sed semper universali in singuJari speculatur, ut unusquisque in se ipso experiri potest. In omni nal11qu e quantum cumque abstracta cogni tion e idolul11 aliquod corporaJe sibi fonnat' (pomponazzi, Tractatlls de ill1l11ortalitate animae, Ch. 9). The translation is way the intellect is dependent on imagination is in the improper third sense of the tem1-dependence as concomitance. Suarez's actual statement of this view was almost breathtaking in its casualness. H e explain ed that Aristotle was talking about dependence in the subj ective and objective sense in premise one but obviously spoke of dependence in another way in premise two . The crucial text of De an.il'l'Ia IIl 28 that seemed to suggest that understanding depended on imagin ation thus had to be read in the third sense of dependence. Suarez concluded: 'and thus this text is solved. ,29 Now he does not continue discussing this issue in the question on immortality . R ather he indicated that he would treat it when he discussed the way in which the intellect depends on imagination , a topic he didn't return to until Disputation Nine. Since Suarez has now opened himself to the charge that his solution is lamely ad hoc, I want to explain just how he characterized the dependence at issue between the imagination and intellect.
IV: Suarez and the proper operation of the intellect [n the Ninth Disputation , Su arez provided an account of the proper operation of the intellect that he thought could undelw rite the independence of the soul from the body and, by extension, preserve immortality. H e did so by radically reconfiguring the relation between imagination and its product, the phantasm, and the work of the intellect. The standard story of the relation between phantasm and intellect was a causal one. The details might vary between acco unts, but that there was some causal relationship seems to have been mandated by Aristotle's assertion that there is no understanding without imagination. Yet Pomponazzi made clear that an attachment to a causal acco unt would make immortality problematic. The very tenn he used, admin.icuhIl1'l-a support, or instrumen t-suggests an instrumental function of imagination for intellect, and we saw that Suarez accepted the fact that using the body as an instrument would render an operation common rather than proper. 30 So, what Suarez did-indeed, what he had no choice but to do, given the way he had set up the problem-was to rej ect any causal conn ection, even an instrumental one, between the operation of imagination and the operation of the intellect. Elsewhere I have argued that Suarez was committed to a view which I have called 'cogniti ve process dualism,' the view that 'no material cognitive process (that is, sensation) can really effect a spiritual cognitive result and no spiritual cognitive process can effect a change in a material cognitive power.'31 Such a modularity of cognitive processes renders problematic Aristotle's claim, which Suarez clearly accepted, that there could be no 28 ARI, 427b27-428a5, 1: 680. 29 'Et ita solvitur iste locus ' (CDA, disp. 2, q. 3, no. 45, 1: 228) . 30 Pine translates adllliniCIIlllm as 'cooperation with,' but that doesn't strike me as quite right given Thomas' discussion in the passage from Selltellaa libri De anillla, Book l , lectio 2 and his use of 'instrumentum .' understanding without imagination. Mter all, how might we account for the necessity of the phantasm unless it played so m e causal role? Under press ure to fmd a proper operation for the intellect, Suarez risked disassociating sensory an d intellectual expeti ence. H ere is the cnlcial p assage from Disputation Nine in which Suarez described the most improper form of dependence holding between imagination and intellect:
For it must be noted that human imagination (phantasia) and intellect are rooted in th e sa me soul and thus it is that they have an order (ordo) and hannony (consensio) in their operations. Hence, ... from the fact that th e intellect operates, the imagi nation also operates. Therefore, in this way, Jjudge that of itself th e potential intellect lacks species, but the soul has a spiritual power to produce in the potential intellect species of those things that sense knows. [This hap pens) not by the sensible imagination concurring efficiently with that action, but by being related as matter, or by exciting the soul, or at any rate (sa ne)32 by being an exemplar. And thus is happens that as soon as th e soul knows (cognosci/) something from imagi nation, through its spiritual power it depicts (depingere), as it were, that thing in the potential intellect. 33 The central point of this passage is clear enough : the soul itselfis the on.ly causal agency in the production of the intelligible species through which the intellect p etforms its proper operation . That is, the intellect has no dep endence in either of its two prop er m eanings on imagination . Of course this raises a host of additional problems, none of which can be addressed here . Suffice it to say that Suarez's account provided more than an ad hoc explanation for how the intellect could operate apart from the body in the afterlife since it operates apart from the body n.ow. It is not the case that the intellect after death will be in a different state than that in which it ftnds itself now. It will still be a power of the so ul whose operation is causally dependent on the so ul alone and not the body. If the so ul becomes aware of the world in so m e different way, that would not chan ge the fact that the intellect is not dependent on the imagination except in a most improper way.
While I do not want to discuss issues surrounding the way that the separated so ul exists and knows,34 I do want to provide two additional passages from the discussion of the separated soul that bear on the issu e of a correct understanding of this improper sense of dependence. Here is the ftrst :
For species and habits of the intellect and will are spiritual since they are in a spiritual subj ect and do not dep end on the body in any way . This is because th e body is neither a material nor efficien t ca use of them since it is of an inferior order. Nor can any oth er mearung of dependency be imagined.
35
Notice that this passage is careful to m ention the two proper types of dependency. It wo uld b e hard to find a passage that more clearly makes the point that the intellect does not depend on the body as either a subj ect or an object. Yet less than a page later we find the following:
For [the intellect] do es not depend on it [the body] as on an organ, but depends on it as something providing species in this life and because of a certain concomitance of operations. N evertheless, this is not essential to th e intellect, but falls to it when it is in the body on accou nt of th e actual collection (colligationem) of these powers. N eve rthel ess, if th e sensitive powers are removed, this dependency does not remain .
36
I bring these two passages up to sho w why it is so hard to recognize the point Suarez was making about dependence. H e simply did not have a distinct term to describe the improper dependency that characterizes the relation between the proper operation of the intellect and the body. Thus, h e slipped rather too easily back to a tenn more obviously relevant to a proper dependency. Given the precise and proper senses of the tem1 'depend,' though, it was simply wrong to say that the intellect depends on the body:
The angelic intellect has from its nature innate species of all realities that, as it were, fl ow from the proper power of the intellect as (quasI) passions flow from an essence. However, the sensitive power, especially (maxime) the extemal senses, lack species and receive them from outside objects. Now OIJr intellect also by its nature lacks species-in which it also falls short of the perfecti on of an angelic intellect-nevertheless it has a certain agreement with it, namely, that as soon as our soul knows some reality through th e imagination, a species representing that reality fl ows (dimanare) fro m the intell ect itself So, this agency is more in the manner of a certain ema nation of th e species from the intellect, and thus this agency is not a distinct power37 35 'Species enim et habitus intellectus et voluntatis sunt spirituales, cum sint in subiecto spirituali nec pendent a corpore ullo modo , quia corpus non est causa illarum materialis nec effi ciens, cum sit inferioris ordinis, nec potest fingi alius modus dependentiae' (CDA, disp. 14, q. 3, no. 3, 3: 466) . 36 'N am non pendet ab illo ut ab orga no, sed lit a ministrante species in hac vita et propter quamdam concomitantiam operationum; hoc tamen non est essentiale intellectui, sed accidit illi dum est in corpore propter actualem colligationem istarum potentiarum, tamen, ablatis potentiis sensitivis, non manet haec dependentia' (CDA, disp. 14, q. 3, no. 5, 3: 468) . Especially worrisome in trus passage is Sua rez's claim that the dependence is only needed in this life since it looks as if Suarez might have been relying on the same distinction that Aquinas relied on to provide an argument for non-dependen ce. But it is important to stress that what was 'lam ely ad hoc' about Aquinas's introduction of this distinction was that it begged the question, which was also Suarez's point in calling it useless .
37 'Angelicus enim intellect us ex natura sua habet inditas species omnium rerum, quae quasi dimanant a virtute propria intellectus, quasi passiones ab essentia; potentia alltem sensitiva, maxime exteriores et speciebus carent et illas ab extrinscis obiectis recipiunt; intellectus autem noster et ex natura sua speciebus caret-in quo et a perfectione angeli declinat-habet tamen convenientiam aliquam cum illo, scilicet quod statim ac anima nostra cognoscit per phantasia m rem aliquam, dimanat ab ipso intellectu species repraesentans rem illam. Unde haec effici entia potius est per modum cuisdam emanationis speciei ab intellectu , et ita non est potentia distincta ilia efficientia (CDA, disp. 9, q. 8, no. 18, 3: 234-6, my emphasis). Leen Spruitt in rus Species lrttelligibilis: From perceptio/1 to k/10lVledge (Leiden and N ew York: Brill, 1994) , 2: 304, rejects any Two points need to be made about this. First, the context of the passage in volves the denial of the distinction between the agent intellect and the potential intellect. Suarez admitted that this was an unusual but not unprecedented stance to take. N evertheless he found it attractive for the simple reason that otherwise he would have been at a loss to explain the purpose of the agent intellect apart fro m its work in conjunction with imagination . At the same time-and this is the second point-the passage clearly suggests a kind of inn at ism in relation to intelligible species. After all, Suarez's commitm ent to 'cognitive process dualism ' made the production of intelligible species concomitant with the operation of imagination, but causally unconnected with it. In oth er words, it was merely the occasion for the production of the species.
Let me sum up . Suarez has argued himself into an acco unt of the intellect in which the intellect must do it all , as it w ere, because the traditional distinction between agent and potential intellects has been eradicated. In addition the intellect is not causally connected to the other vital operations o f the soul, the common operations. Although, thanks to an inner harmony or consonance among its powers, the intellect thinks whenever the imagination imagines. The upshot, though, is that by making these radical claims Suarez did preserve a proper operation for the intellect-an operation that depended on the body neither subjectively nor obj ectively, but still depended on the body's role of imagination .
The thoroughgoing insistence by Pomponazzi on the inextricability of matter and form, even where that fom1 is a human intellect, had pushed Suarez into a kind of incipient dualism. Of course he was only halfway there since he remained committed to a hylomorphic analysis of substances, including human beings38 and also because he did not have Descartes' conception of matter. N onetheless in consolidating all intellective functions within a 'mind' causally unaffected by the body he was clearly pushing the boundaries of Aristotelian thought. H ence it does not appear too surprising when Suarez writes: 'However, in human beings, even though a human being is what especially subsists, nonetheless this subsistence is due especially to the soul, which is united to a body not as if it were receiving support from the body, but rather as using it as a conjoined instmment.'39
In conclusion it may worth noting certain similarities between Suarez and Descartes, without indicating any influence. The passages in Descartes that resonate most strongly with Suarez's account as I have presented it might be these:
We make such a judgment not because these things transmit the ideas to our mind through the sense organs, but because they transmit something which, at exactly that moment, gives the mind occasion to form these ideas by means of the faculty innate to it. Nothing reaches our mind from external objects through th e sense organs except certain corporeal motions, as our author himself asserts in article nineteen, in accordance with my own principles. But neither the motions themselves nor the figures arising from them are co nceived by us exactly as they occur in the sense organs, as r have explained at length in my Optics 40 The ideas of pain , colours, sounds and the like must be all the more innate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions.
1
One aspect of these passages that strikes me as especially significant is the identification of pain , colours, and sounds as innate. While Suarez was careful to demarcate the sensitive operations of the soul from the intellectual, it is nonetheless true that he thought that our intellectual awareness of such states must be innate, at least if we are to generalize the claims about intelligible species in the passage above to cover all intelligible species. For Suarez intelligible species can represent both singulars and universals . But since an intelligible species is not caused by anything bodily, and is produced from the intellect only on the occasion of some sensory operation, it would seem that even sensations of singular sounds must be innate.
As interesting as it would be to compare these passages more fully, the point of this chapter is not to show that Suarez is a proto-Cartesian, but rather to show that the radical moves Suarez made within the tradition were quite well motivated. Thus historians of philosophy ignore the context of a thinker like Suarez with some peril when we read him simply as someone who did not understand Aquinas properly.42 In addition, that context is one that is decisively shaped by the philosophical movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that fact, in tum, suggests that if we really want a proper appreciation of the transition to modem philosophy, we are likely to find it only through additional explorations of sixteenth-century thinkers. 40 'Judicemus ... non quia istae res illas ipsas nostrae memi per organa sensuum immisenmt, sed quia tamen aliquid inuniserunt, sed quia tamen aliquid inmliserum, quod ei dedit occasionem ad ipsas, per innatam sibi £1cultatem, hoc tempore potius quam alio, efformandas. Quippe nihil ab objectis extemis ad memem nostrum per organa sensuum accedit, praeter motus quosdam corporeos, ut ipsemet all thor "oster, i" arl. 19, ex meis principiis affinnat; sed ne quidem ipsi motus, nec figurae ex iis ortae, a nobis concipiuntur, quales in organis sensuum flUnt, ut fuse in Dioplrica explicui' (Rene Descartes, COl1lmetlls Otl a Certain Broadsheet, AT 8b: 358-9, CSMK 1: 304).
